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The Ecology of Language in Ukraine
Bridget Goodman
University of Pennsylvania
Since becoming an independent nation in 1991, Ukraine, like other post-Soviet 
countries, has heavily promoted the use and development of the titular language 
to reverse the effects of historical discrimination and Russification.  This paper uses 
an ecological framework to illustrate the deeper complexities of the relationship 
among Ukrainian, Russian and additional languages in Ukraine in:  1) historical 
and geographical aspects of national language policy and practice, 2) language-
in-education policies, 3) language use and language attitudes, and 4) the current 
role of English in Ukraine.  I conclude that state support for Ukrainian contin-
ues to be justified.  The necessary level of language rights protections for Russian 
speakers, including Russian-speaking Ukrainians, is still subject to debate. The 
unique interplay of policy, practice and cultural norms in Ukraine are likely to im-
pact future Russian or Ukrainian language planning outcomes. English study and 
use, however, may be more influenced by bottom-up, regional policy decisions.
Introduction
Nancy Hornberger, drawing on the work of Einar Haugen and Peter Müh-lhäusler, says, “languages, like living species, evolve, grow, change, live, and die in relation to other languages and also in relation to their environ-
ment” (2003, p. 320).  The language environment in the republics of the former 
Soviet Union could be fairly described as predatory. Titular languages (the main 
territorial language of each republic) have over the course of time evolved, grown, 
changed, and been threatened with extinction by Russian-speaking political pow-
ers. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, titular languages have risen back to 
power, sometimes threatening the former imperial power.   Nevertheless, Russian 
continues to be used in the region to varying degrees (Pavlenko, 2008). English has 
also been growing in status, posing a potentially new threat to titular languages, 
Russian, and minority languages in the post-Soviet region (Phillipson & Skutnabb-
Kangas, 1996).  
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the historical and current ecology 
of language in one post-Soviet republic, Ukraine.  The ecology will be described 
thematically in four main sections:  1) national language planning, 2) language-
in-education policy, 3) language use and language attitudes, and 4) the status of 
English.  A tripartite theoretical framework will be used to explain the ecology of 
language in Ukraine.  The first part is explicit and implicit policy supporting or 
prohibiting language, explored in the domains of status planning (planning the 
recognition of a language by society), corpus planning (developing the lexicon and 
orthography of a language for those functions), and acquisition planning (plan-
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ning the learning of the language) (Cooper, 1989; Wiley, 1996)1. The second part is 
actual practice in Ukraine in relation to language planning and policy.  To this end, 
special attention will be paid to covert and overt policy.  As Schiffman observes, 
“Soviet language policy…exhibited characteristics that exemplified the ‘covert’ in 
conflict with the more overt policy” (Schiffman, 2006, p. 115).  It will be shown that 
the covert/overt distinction is also relevant to a discussion of post-Soviet Ukraine, 
at least in the first decade of independence.  The third part is what Schiffman calls 
the linguistic culture:  “the sum totality of ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, preju-
dices, myths, religious strictures, and all the other cultural ‘baggage’ that speakers 
bring to their dealings with language from their culture” (Schiffman, 2006, p. 112). 
Ukrainians themselves might refer to this as their “mentality”2.  
The paper has been organized to progress from themes that are predominantly 
policy-oriented through practice-dominant themes to those themes most connect-
ed with culture.  However, policy, practice, and culture do not exist in isolation; 
thus, each section of the paper draws on all three points of the theoretical frame-
work to the extent they are relevant.  
National Language Planning 
Waves of Russification and Ukrainianization
At the level of national language planning, Ukrainian history can be charac-
terized by waves of “Russification” or “Ukrainianization” (also called “Ukraini-
zation”). Russification refers to the promulgation of the Russian language as the 
sole language of public life.  In periods when Ukrainian is the sole language being 
promulgated, the movement is referred to as Ukrainization or Ukrainianization3. 
With the exception of three years at the inception of the Ukrainian Soviet Social-
ist Republic when Ukrainian and Russian were recognized as two generally used 
languages (Shevelov, 1989), official language policy in Ukraine has generally fo-
cused on promoting the public use of either Russian or Ukrainian to the exclusion 
or denigration of the other.  Moreover, the official role of these two languages has 
changed several times over the course of history.  
The first era of Russification can be traced back to the second half of the eigh-
teenth century, when the Russian empire sought to tighten its control over the 
Cossack lands in the central and eastern portion of present-day Ukraine which 
had been annexed (from the Russian point of view) with the signing of the Agree-
ment of Pereiaslav (Magocsi, 2007).  This region, which had just emerged from 
Polish government rule after a rebellion led by the Cossack warrior Bohdan 
Khmel’nyt’skyi, found itself overpowered by the Russians. The empire brought 
serfdom, a new administration and institutions, and the use of the Russian lan-
guage instead of Ukrainian in official settings.  As a result, the Ukrainian language 
experienced a sharp decline in use in the region.  Ukrainian in the Russian empire 
nevertheless experienced a renaissance in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
led by the works of the poet Taras Shevchenko (Friedman, 2006). This renaissance 
was thwarted by the Ems Ukaz (decree) of 1876, which banned the Ukrainian 
language in virtually all spheres of public life including printing or translation 
(except belles-lettres and historical records), public performances, importation of 
Ukrainian books from Ukrainian-speaking areas of Poland (where the language 
was not restricted), and Ukrainian language instruction in schools. Teachers iden-
tified as “Ukrainophiles” were dismissed and students were expelled (Hrycak, 
2006; Shevelov, 1989; Solchanyk, 1985). 
The tide of official policy turned in favor of the Ukrainian language in 1920, 
when the first of several decrees intended to make Ukrainian the language of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was passed by the All-Ukrainian Central Ex-
ecutive Committee.  The last decree in 1925 made Ukrainianization mandatory 
in all spheres (Solchanyk, 1985). Communist party members and government 
workers in Ukraine were commanded to learn Ukrainian; workers who did not 
speak Ukrainian could be fired (Hrycak, 2006; Shevelov, 1989)4. Overtly, these ef-
forts were part of Stalin’s union-wide movement for korenizatsiia [indigenization], 
the bringing of the native population of the republics into the Communist party 
ranks (Magocsi, 2007). The covert reason, however, was the appeasement of the 
peasants who were being treated poorly in the big cities for speaking Ukrainian 
instead of Russian (Bilaniuk, 2005; Shevelov, 1989). Regardless of the reason for the 
shift, Ukrainianization had a significant impact on Ukrainian-language education 
from 1925 to 1930.  From 1922 to 1930, the number of Ukrainian-language schools 
jumped from 6,105 to 14,430, while the number of Russian-language schools de-
creased from 1,966 to 1,504 (Shevelov, 1989). Moreover, 81% of all adult literacy 
schools in 1925 used Ukrainian as the language of instruction, and in 1928 Ukrai-
nian was the language of 42% of university classes (Magocsi, 2007). Such policies, 
however, could not change the stereotype among Russians and urban Ukrainians 
that Ukrainianization was a farce or that Ukrainian was the backwards dialect 
of the villages. One joke from that time went, “Do you speak seriously or Ukrai-
nian?” (Shevelov, 1989).     
On a more positive note, the years of Ukrainianization in the 1920s were also 
a period of scholarly cultivation of a standardized Ukrainian corpus and orthog-
raphy. In 1927, the Kharkiv Conference on Orthography developed 103 rules for 
the spelling of native Ukrainian words and foreign borrowings, drawing on both 
the prestigious Kyiv-Poltavan dialect in Soviet Ukraine and the Galician dialect of 
what was then eastern Poland5. The conference members also developed neolo-
gisms to reduce the number of Russian or Polish cognates and to make Ukrainian 
more literary than colloquial (Friedman, 2006; Shevelov, 1989; Wexler, 1974). Fish-
man refers to this type of corpus planning as Ausbau, “building the language away 
from an overpowering and structurally very similar neighbor, relative to which it 
is often perceived as a dialect rather than as a really autonomous language” (Fish-
man, 2006, p. 317). In Ukraine, Ausbau became a pretext for the end of Ukrainian-
ization and the party purges of the 1930s6.  One by one, linguists who had worked 
on the standardization of the Ukrainian corpus and orthography were put on trial 
for trumped-up charges of “language sabotage” (accentuating differences between 
Ukrainian and Russian) or “treasonous irredentism” (pushing the language away 
from Russia and towards the foreign enemy, Poland) (Friedman, 2006).  They were 
sent to gulags, shot, driven to suicide, or simply disappeared (Fishman, 2006; Shev-
elov, 1989; Solchanyk, 1985).  
By 1938, Russification was the norm again, albeit in a subtler form. A new 
decree that year required the study of Russian in all non-Russian schools in the  So-
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viet Union (Solchanyk, 1985), but not to the exclusion of the indigenous language. 
The corpus and orthography of Ukrainian were also changed to bring the lan-
guage closer to Russian again (Fishman, 1979; Friedman, 2006).  Although overtly 
it seemed that Ukrainian and Russian co-existed in the country, the terror of the 
purges as well as the need to know Russian to progress in party leadership or pur-
sue higher education made the reality of Russification quite clear. While practiced 
in less severe forms after Stalin, Russification continued in status, corpus, and ac-
quisition planning for the remainder of the Soviet era.
The Current Era of Ukrainianization (1989-Present)
The year 1989 (two years before independence in 1991) was one of significant 
policy changes in the Soviet Union. Following the lead of other Soviet republics 
and the activism of the Ukrainian Rukh political group, the Ukrainian Soviet gov-
ernment passed a Law of Languages in October 1989.  According to Arel (1995), the 
law established four principles:  1) that the official language, i.e., Ukrainian, was 
to be the sole language of administration, replacing Russian; 2) that Ukrainian lan-
guage study was now mandatory in all Russian schools; 3) that higher educational 
institutions would eventually have to use Ukrainian as the medium of instruction; 
and 4) that external signs should be in either Ukrainian only or Ukrainian and 
Russian.  Article 10 of the Constitution, adopted in 1996 and amended in 1999, is 
less specific than the 1989 law but no less clear on the position of Ukrainian:
Article 10 
The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. 
The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the 
Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory 
of Ukraine. 
In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other lan-
guages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed. 
The State promotes the learning of languages of international communication. 
The use of languages in Ukraine is guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine 
and is determined by law. (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2008)7  
With the passages of the Law of Languages and the Constitution have come 
additional laws designed to strengthen Ukrainianization in policy and prac-
tice (Friedman, 2006; Pavlenko, 2008).  Ukrainian is now the language of the 
government, law, and official documentation (Pavlenko, 2008).  In the 1990s, 
laws were passed stipulating that all Ukraine-based television stations and 
billboards be in Ukrainian, and making Ukrainian language and literature an 
obligatory subject (Friedman, 2006).  A 1998 law requires that foreign movies 
either have Ukrainian subtitles or (more commonly) be dubbed into Ukrainian. 
This law was upheld by the Constitutional Court (Borisow, 2008; Sewall, 2008). 
The government has also proposed requiring international channels be dubbed 
in Ukrainian (Poludenko, 2008).  
Such Ukrainianization policies might seem punitive towards Russian speak-
ers, but as Fimyar points out, “implementation and monitoring of the existing 
policies has been highly selective and unsystematic” (2008, p. 574).  In addition, 
sanctions against individuals or groups who fail to comply with Ukrainianiza-
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tion laws are generally not imposed (Cherednychenko, 1997; Hrycak, 2006; Søvik 
2007).  For example, Ukrainian public television stations regularly broadcast Rus-
sian-language shows (original programming from Russia or foreign movies which 
have been dubbed into Russian)—usually with Ukrainian subtitles but sometimes 
without Ukrainian subtitles8.  Cable or satellite channels as of June 2009 still broad-
cast in their original language.  
In short, current Ukrainianization policies are justified as necessary to protect 
the Ukrainian language from the historical threat of the Russian language (Arel, 
1995) and from Russia itself (Søvik, 2007).  Ukrainianization policies are imple-
mented in a less heavy-handed fashion than the Russification policies of the past, 
allowing Russian to continue to be used by Russophone Ukrainians.   It will be 
shown in the next section that the educational system has also undergone a shift 
in favor of Ukrainian, with smaller spaces left for the continued development of 
Russian and other languages.  
Language-in-Education Policy
Ukrainian has increasingly become the main language of education; from 
2005-2006, 78% of elementary and secondary students were in Ukrainian-language 
schools, a 30% increase since 1991 (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008; Hrycak, 2006).  Teach-
ers and professors at higher educational establishments are required to use only 
Ukrainian (Fimyar, 2008; NL, personal communication, April, 21, 2008), though 
there is evidence that they continue to use Russian (Goodman & Lyulkun, 2008; 
Søvik, 2007). Moreover, the labels “Ukrainian-language school” and “Russian-lan-
guage school” do not reflect the fact that students in Russian-language schools also 
learn Ukrainian as a separate subject (VE, personal communication, June 10, 2009). 
In Ukrainian-language schools, Russian may be taught alongside other foreign 
languages such as English or German, and selected works of Russian literature are 
incorporated - in Ukrainian translation - into the course on world literature (Pav-
lenko, 2008; Søvik, 2007).  Literature is one sphere where Ukrainian is likely being 
promoted for status reasons to the detriment of Russian. Stepanenko observes, 
“The particular emphasis on languages with a priority of the Ukrainian language 
and literature over the Russian language represents the most vivid manifestation 
of the state policy of Ukrainisation in schools” (1999, p. 106).  In addition, some 
Ukrainians have said “what a pity it is” that students are not reading Pushkin and 
other great Russian writers in the original language (Søvik, 2007; MD, personal 
communication, May 14, 2009).  
Geographic, Cultural and Political Dimensions 
National data on the medium of instruction also do not reflect the unique geo-
linguistic patterns of language use in Ukraine.  As Bilaniuk and Melnyk note, “the 
two main ethnic groups in Ukraine are unevenly distributed, with the greatest 
concentration of Russians in eastern and southern Ukraine, and generally in urban 
areas” (2008, p. 3).  The western oblast [administrative region] of Ternopil is 98% 
Ukrainian and 1% Russian, while the eastern oblast of Donetsk is 38% Ukrainian 
and 57% Russian.  This ethnic distribution has resulted in a corresponding - though 
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not identical - distribution of Ukrainian and Russian language schools in the na-
tion. Although the goal of the Ukrainian national government has been to bring 
Ukrainian-language education in line with the ethnic composition of the popula-
tion (Hrycak, 2006; Janmaat 1999), a comparison of 2005-2006 school data (from 
Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008) with the most recent Ukrainian census data (State Sta-
tistics Committee of Ukraine, 2003-2004) indicates that this goal has been achieved 
in only three oblasts, all in the east or south:  Dnipropetrovs’k, Kharkiv, and Kher-
son.  In all other southern and eastern oblasts except Mykolaiv the percentages of 
Ukrainian-language classes are lower, especially in areas with a native Ukrainian 
population of less than 60% (Hrycak, 2006).  Conversely, in Kyiv and the west-
ern Ukrainian oblasts, percentages of Ukrainian-language school attendance have 
increased to levels higher than the native Ukrainian population, indicating that 
Russians and other ethnic minorities are attending Ukrainian-language schools 
in these areas (Arel, 1996; Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008; Janmaat, 1999; State Statistics 
Committee of Ukraine, 2003-2004).  
Such trends can be explained in part by the geopolitical and geolinguistic his-
tory of Ukraine.  The southern and easternmost parts of Ukraine had high rates 
of immigration from Russia after World War II (Magocsi, 2007).  The westernmost 
oblasts of Ukraine were not annexed until 1944; prior to that, Ukrainian speakers 
in the west were living under the rule of Poland, then the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire, then Poland again.  Under both the Polish and Austro-Hungarian systems, 
Ukrainian speakers had relatively more freedom to use and study Ukrainian, and 
developed a stronger sense of nationalism in connection with the Ukrainian lan-
guage (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008; Shevelov, 1989).  The Crimean peninsula, which 
Bilaniuk and Melnyk (2008) state has the lowest numbers of Ukrainian-language 
schools (5%), was a gift to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 from 
Khrushchev.  Before that it was an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.  In addi-
tion, Crimea is home to an ethnic Russian majority and a large Tatar-speaking pop-
ulation which was banished by the Soviets but allowed to return after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (Kreindler, 1997).  Because of these factors (as well as years of 
negotiating with the Ukrainian government), Crimea once again has the status of 
an autonomous republic and has the constitutional right to “ensure the function-
ing and development of the state language and national languages and cultures in 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2008).  
Other phenomena of ethnicity and language in education can be explained 
culturally as language retention (use of the ethnic language at home and in school), 
language integration (compliance with national policy by studying the titular lan-
guage at school while maintaining the ethnic language at home), or language as-
similation (both studying the titular language in school and using it at home). 
Arel says, “The quiet Ukrainianization of the Kiev schools suggests that both the 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians and the Russians of Kiev find it in their interest to 
integrate into the nation-building project” (1996, p. 77).  Janmaat (1999), in his 
survey of Russian and mixed Russian-Ukrainian families in four Ukrainian cities, 
also found evidence of language integration in Kyiv9. In L’viv, however, mixed 
Ukrainian-Russian couples assimilated to Ukrainian while Russian couples opt-
ed for language retention. Janmaat suggests that because of the predominance of 
Ukrainian culture in L’viv, the Russian couples resist assimilation or integration 
out of fear of cultural loss.  
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In addition to an “east-west” divide, language in Ukraine is often said to have 
an “urban-rural” divide—Russian in the cities and Ukrainian in the villages (Shev-
elov, 1989).  Occasionally, this view has a positive connotation, as when one talks 
about the beauty of the Ukrainian language for describing nature and other things 
pastoral (Friedman, 2006).  Generally, though, the stereotype is negative:  “even 
though Ukrainian is now the sole state language of the country, stereotypes persist 
of Ukrainian as a backward peasant language, in contrast to Russian as the ‘civi-
lized’ and ‘highly cultured’ language” (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008, p. 2).  In Soviet 
times, the urban-rural divide was a component of language-in-education policy; 
students in rural areas attended Ukrainian-language schools, while urban areas 
were Russified (Arel, 1995; Hrycak, 2006). Given the current high levels of Ukraini-
an-language study in formerly Russified oblasts, it seems unlikely that this urban/
rural divide persists to the same degree in Ukrainian education today. However, 
more research is needed to attest this fact. 
The Politics of Language in Education: The Fallacy of Parental Choice
While geographic and ethnic factors are important in understanding patterns 
of language in education in Ukraine, it would be incorrect to assume that these 
patterns are usually based on parental choice. In fact, much of Ukrainian edu-
cation history—both Soviet and post-Soviet—can be characterized by an official 
orientation to parental choice but an unofficial tendency away from it.  In 1958, 
the Soviet Union under Khrushchev revoked the 1938 Russian-language mandate; 
study at a Russian-language school was now “voluntarily chosen” (Bilaniuk & 
Melnyk, 2008; Hrycak, 2006; Kreindler, 1997; Lewytzkyj 1984; quotes original to 
Kreindler).  Hrycak (2006) notes,
Only in the countryside and the newly annexed Western Ukraine did 
most ethnic Ukrainians continue to attend Ukrainian-language schools. 
In cities elsewhere in Ukraine, the policy of “parental choice” compelled 
most children to attend either Russian schools or a new type of bilingual 
school in which Russian was in fact the primary language of instruction 
and Ukrainian was studied as a separate subject. (p. 73)
Since 1989, parental choice policy and practice have continued to diverge. 
Article 25 of the 1989 Law of Languages gave parents the right to choose the 
language of instruction for their children (Janmaat, 1999). Although this right 
was said to be “inalienable,” this part of the law “has been disregarded by the 
Ministry of Education since the 1990s” (Arel, 2006). Yet this time it is primarily 
Russian speakers who have no choice but to send their children to Ukrainian-
language schools.  Janmaat (1999), in interviews with school officials in the 
mid-1990s in L’viv (west), Kyiv (central), Odesa (south), and Donets’k (east), 
found that only Donets’k has honored legislation stipulating that a Russian-
language class be opened if eight to ten parents request it.  In the other three 
cities, officials maintained that their decision to increase the number of Ukrai-
nian-language classes was based on surveys or consultations with parents.  The 
parents Janmaat interviewed, however, maintained it was administrative pres-
sure, forced personnel shift, or a decision made without any parental survey 
that led to the decision about the medium of instruction.
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National Minorities and Language in Education
The minority language with the highest status in Ukraine nowadays is 
Russian.  Not only do ethnic Russians comprise the largest minority ethnic 
group, Russian is the only language named in the Constitution as a minority 
language.  At the same time, having the status of a minority language is a sig-
nificant downward shift for Russian speakers (Fournier, 2002; Janmaat, 1999; 
Pavlenko, 2008).  While there have been pushes over the years to make Russian 
an official language alongside Ukrainian, so far such efforts have failed. Part of 
Cherednychenko’s rationale for resisting making Russian an official language 
is as follows, 
without trying to diminish the Russian language with its rich literary 
tradition and its international standing, it is necessary to point out 
that it is neither inferior nor superior to other international languages 
and therefore should not be given special status in any part of the 
world…undoubtedly, the Russian language will preserve this status 
and it will strengthen the position of the Russian language, in Ukraine 
as well.  That is why this language does not require legislative protec-
tion usually given by a state to its state language. (1997, p. 58)
Although Ukrainian and Russian are the most prevalent ethnic groups, 
comprising over 95% of the total population, Ukraine boasts over 130 na-
tionalities and ethnic groups (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2003-
2004). The percentage claiming their ancestral language as their mother 
tongue varies widely.10  
Table 1
National Minorities in Ukraine (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2003-2004)

    
           
           
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26
WPEL VoLumE 24, NumbEr 2
11
All minority language groups are guaranteed the right to free develop-
ment, use and protection of their national language according to the Consti-
tution of Ukraine. An additional layer of protection comes from Ukraine’s 
1996 signing and 2006 ratification of the European Charter for Regional and 
Minority Languages (ECRML) (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 1998; Nic Craith, 2006; 
Søvik, 2007)12.  As a result, there has been limited but noteworthy prog-
ress for minority languages as a medium of instruction in some schools in 
Ukraine.  In the 2005-2006 school year, Ukraine had school classes which 
were conducted in Romanian, Hungarian, Crimean Tatar, Moldavian/Mol-
dovan, Polish, Bulgarian, and Slovak. Many of these schools were bilingual 
(Ukrainian and the minority language) or trilingual (Ukrainian, Russian, 
and the minority language) (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008).  This means, how-
ever, that speakers of other languages are receiving education in Russian or 
Ukrainian depending on where in Ukraine they live. 
Like Russian- and Ukrainian-language education, there is a noticeable 
geographic component to minority language education.  Yakobets (2004) 
found that Romanian-language schools are offered in only three oblasts: 
Chernautsi (Chernivtsi), Odesa, and Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia). All three 
oblasts border Moldova or Romania.  Gordon said of the Polish minority: 
“they make up only 0.43% of the population and are not geographically 
concentrated in one area.  This has no doubt contributed to the assimilation 
and loss of national identity of the Polish population in Ukraine” (Gordon, 
1996, p. 226).  
Even speakers of minority languages who have access to mother-tongue 
education face educational challenges in Ukraine. Yakobets (2004) and Gor-
don (1996) both found a lack of adequate mother-tongue reading and teach-
ing materials for Romanian and Polish classes respectively.  National exams 
pose another problem.  When the Ukrainian government decided for the 
first time to implement a standardized college entrance exam system in the 
spring of 2008, Crimean government officials asked the Ministry of Educa-
tion to translate the exams into Russian.  The Ministry relented, agreeing to 
translate the exams into the languages of national minorities—but only for 
two years as a transitional period (Orlova, 2008). 
In summary, Ukrainian schools are adhering more strongly to poli-
cies that support the use of Ukrainian in schools regardless of paren-
tal wishes.  This pattern has a historical basis in Soviet language-in-
education policy, but it now favors the Ukrainian language instead of 
the Russian language.  In regions of the country with high numbers of 
ethnic language minorities (including ethnic Russians), students have a 
greater chance of attending a school taught in their mother tongue; in 
those schools they are also likely to be encouraged to learn Ukrainian.  If 
Ukrainian truly becomes the dominant language in higher education, the 
demand for Ukrainian in elementary and secondary schools regardless 
of the language spoken at home may rise. In the next section it will be 
shown, however, that that language use and attitudes outside of school 
have been and are likely to be more fluid.  
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LANGUAGE USE AND LANGUAGE ATTITUDES
Native Language and National Identity
That the Ukrainian language is a symbol of national identity should not be 
surprising given the well-documented relationship between language and na-
tionalism or national identity (c.f. Fishman, 1997; Nic Craith, 2006).  Hrycak (2006) 
traces the identification of the Ukrainian language with nationalism as far back to the 
1860s, when Ukrainophile educators recognized Ukrainian as a distinct native lan-
guage which was most suitable as the medium of instruction.  The Russian Empire 
responded with the Valuev Circular of 1863, which signified concern that a separate 
Ukrainian language was an expression against Russia and a precursor to “Little Rus-
sia” (as Ukraine was called then) becoming a separate Ukrainian nation:
A Little Russian language has not, does not, and cannot exist, and its 
dialects as spoken by the masses are the same as the Russian language, 
with the exception of some corruptions from Poland…those people who 
are attempting to prove the opposite are reproached by the majority of 
Little Russians themselves for separatist intentions that are dangerous 
for Russia and detrimental to Little Russia. (Magocsi, 1996, as cited in 
Friedman, 2006, p. 67)  
In Soviet times, Ukrainians were encouraged to see nationality and native lan-
guage as connected with their ancestral homeland, despite official public discourses 
discouraging nationalism (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008; Hrycak, 2006).  In 1989 the Ukrainian 
Rukh party addressed the previous repression of the Ukrainian language and asserted the 
right to develop both the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian nation-state:
As a result of the colonialist policy of the Czarist regime, and later of the 
gross violation of generally recognized principles of national existence 
during the times of Stalin and Brezhnev, the destruction of the creative 
and scholarly intelligentsia, the artificial narrowing of the domain of the 
Ukrainian language…now the Ukrainian people faces the need to revive 
its national culture via the over-all development of the Ukrainian lan-
guage, which is the determining factor of the existence of a nation. (as 
cited in Fishman, 1997, p. 286)  
Perhaps as a result of this emphasis on language and nationhood, nowadays 
“native language” (ridna mova in Ukrainian, rodnoi jazik in Russian) denotes the 
native homeland, not the native home (Arel, 2002; Friedman, 2006).  As Friedman 
says:  “the ridna mova of ethnic Ukrainians is presumed to be Ukrainian, regardless 
of what they actually speak” (Friedman, 2006, p. 86).  Most Ukrainians who grew 
up speaking Russian at home claim Ukrainian as their native language on the cen-
sus, and the percentage of people in Ukraine claiming Ukrainian nationality and 
Ukrainian as a native language increased by 5% and 3% respectively from 1989 to 
2001 (Arel, 2002, 2006; Bilaniuk & Melnyk 2008; Hrycak, 2006; Friedman, 2006). 
Thus, while it has been said that the mother tongue is “the central symbol of indi-
vidual and collective identity” (de Cillia, 2002 as cited in Wodak, 2006), in Ukraine 
either identification with the linguistic collective tends to be emphasized over in-
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dividual linguistic identity (Arel, 1995), or at best differentiated so that Ukrainian 
is a symbol of collective identity and Russian is a symbol of personal and local 
identity (Søvik, 2007).  
In education, the result is that “the basic nationalist premise that the language 
of instruction is not a matter of choice but of heritage has quietly prevailed since 
independence” (Arel, 2006, p. 8).  A recent survey of Ukrainian university students 
in central-western Ukraine supports these national findings.  Over 90% of students 
agreed with the statement “Ukrainian is a symbol of our national identity”, and 
nearly equal numbers agreed that Ukrainian should be the language of classes 
and exams, although actual usage of Ukrainian in and out of class was reportedly 
lower (Goodman & Lyulkun, 2008). The symbolic value of Ukrainian as the native 
language of the Ukrainian homeland is also reflected in the discourse of Russo-
phone Ukrainians about Ukrainianization. Fournier (2002) found that Russophone 
Ukrainians who complain about Ukrainization are not denying the role of Ukrai-
nian in their identity; rather, they resent a denial of their hybrid cultural and lin-
guistic connections to both Ukraine and “brother Russia”13. 
Bilingualism 
Kreindler characterizes Ukraine as “basically a bi-ethnic, bi-linguistic state” 
(Kreindler, 1997, p. 96).  It is important to recognize that Kreindler’s use of the 
term “bi-linguistic” should not be glossed as “bilingual”, though many people 
in Ukraine are proficient in both Ukrainian and Russian and alternate their 
use of Ukrainian and Russian at home, in meetings or informal events, and in 
Ukrainian-language schools when class is dismissed (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008; 
Friedman, 2006; Pavlenko, 2008). The term “bilingualism” is stigmatized in 
Ukraine because the Soviet-era promotion of “bilingualism” was a euphemism 
for transition of non-Russians to Russian (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008; Cheredny-
chenko 1997).  Moreover, Ukrainian nationalists saw this “bilingualism” as 
harmful to the development of the mother tongue (Arel, 1995).  Even if Ukrai-
nians did manage to become bilingual in the Soviet educational system, ethnic 
Russians generally remained unilingual (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008; Cheredny-
chenko 1997).  A 2007 survey of language use suggests this imbalanced pattern 
persists in Ukrainian society:  ethnic Ukrainians are 2.7 times more likely than 
ethnic Russians to be bilingual at home (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008).  
The second problem with the term “bilingualism” is that it does not ad-
equately capture a phenomenon in Ukraine referred to by Ukrainian scholars 
as cooperative nonaccommodation (Pavlenko, 2008) or nonreciprocal bilingualism 
(Bilaniuk, 2005).  Pavlenko defines cooperative nonaccommodation as a situ-
ation in which “each party conducts the conversation in their preferred lan-
guage, with the expectation of being understood and respected by the other 
party” (2008, p. 62).  While the terms “nonaccommodation” and “nonrecipro-
cal” suggest either a negative stance towards the language of the interlocutor 
or the continued hegemony of Russian as the language of power, status, cul-
ture, and urban style, the prevalence of this type of communication at home, 
on the street, and in television shows is taken as a positive indicator of the 
equality and acceptance of both languages (Bilaniuk, 2005; Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 
2008; Pavlenko, 2008).  
Both the choice of ethnic Russians not to learn Ukrainian and the choice of 
ethnic Ukrainians to use their language of preference regardless of the language of 
their interlocutor might be facilitated by the ease with which speakers of Ukrainian 
and Russian can develop passive proficiency in each other’s language.  Ukrainian 
and Russian are both in the Eastern Slavonic language group and they are both 
written in the Cyrillic alphabet. Many words and grammatical forms in Ukrainian 
and Russian derive from a common source (Old Church Slavonic), Soviet corpus 
and orthography policies led to the development of many Ukrainian words which 
are Russian cognates, and both languages are used widely in Ukraine today.  As 
Janmaat observes, compared to other Soviet republics “Ukraine appears to be a 
special case in that...with a little effort, Ukrainians and Russians can understand 
each other’s language even if they have never heard the other language before” 
(1999, p. 477).
Surzhyk:  The Problem of Codemixing
Baker (2001) says very few people who speak two languages keep those lan-
guages completely separate.  Nevertheless, codemixing is often viewed negatively 
by the monolingual speakers of one of the varieties being mixed as well as those 
who do the codemixing.  Derogatory terms for common practices of codemixing 
include Hinglish (Hindu-English), Spanglish (Spanish-English), and Wenglish 
(Welsh-English).  In Ukraine the mixing of Ukrainian and Russian has the deroga-
tory term surzhyk (literally, a mix of low-quality flour grains).  What is perhaps 
unique to the Ukrainian context14 or at least important to know about surzhyk is 
that such mixed language is not just codemixing at the topic or sentence level; it 
is also the fusion of Ukrainian and Russian forms into a third form.  For example, 
in Russian the word for city is город [gorəd] while the Ukrainian word is 
місто [misto]15. Bilaniuk interviewed one woman who substituted the Russian 
[g] with a Ukrainian [h] and the Russian akanie (schwa in the unstressed vowel) 
with the Ukrainian clear vowel, creating the form /horod/ (Bilaniuk, 2005) .  The 
closeness of the two languages may make it more difficult for speakers not to mix 
them.  As Friedman says, “while Ukrainian and Russian contain many distinctive 
features, the boundaries between them are by no means as clear or as impermeable 
as the labels ‘Ukrainian language’ and ‘Russian language’ might suggest” (Fried-
man, 2006, p. 53).  
Surzhyk has many denotations in Ukrainian society, covering such diverse 
referents as entire village dialects, the insertion of Russian words into Ukrainian 
speech, or simply a Russian “accent” in one’s Ukrainian (Bilaniuk 2005; Bilaniuk 
& Melnyk, 2008).  This last definition in particular indexes the shift in status of 
Ukrainian.  Historically surzhyk was generally defined as codemixing by Ukrai-
nian peasants who were trying to sound more cultured or educated by adding 
Russian words to their speech, often incorrectly (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008); now it 
can refer to urban Russian speakers who are trying to use Ukrainian.  
Whether surzhyk results from Russian in Ukrainian or Ukrainian in Russian, 
the attitude towards surzhyk is overwhelmingly negative.  It has been called a “dis-
ease,” a product of “Ukrainian self-hate and self-denigration,” a “national trag-
edy”, and “malointelihentna [less educated],” among other things (Bernsand, 2006; 
Bilaniuk, 2005). Ukrainian pop artists who have used Russianisms in their songs 
30
WPEL VoLumE 24, NumbEr 2
have been harshly criticized by journalists, and the artists themselves have ex-
pressed their shame at having such poor knowledge of Ukrainian (Bilaniuk, 2005). 
There are anti-surzhyk books sold in stores.  Friedman (2006) found that students 
who used Russian or fused Ukrainian and Russian forms in classroom discourse 
were interrupted and corrected by the teacher.  
Ukrainians who denigrate the use of mixed language are generally concerned 
either with language purity in general, with cultivating a language separate from 
Russian, or elevating the status of Ukrainian (Bilaniuk, 2005; Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 
2008; Friedman, 2006).  On the other hand, there are speakers who defend the use 
of surzhyk.  Bilaniuk (2005) spoke with a Ukrainian who preferred to use the term 
‘mixed language’, and said people who are concerned with linguistic purity are ac-
tually perpetuating Soviet models of cultural correctness.  Flier adds that surzhyk 
has a positive status in certain elements of Ukrainian society, though the majority 
of these elements might be considered counterculture:
Surzhyk has gained a certain cachet as the language of the alienated and 
the rebellious, of those who press against the norms of social convention, 
whether members of the youth culture, the underworld, the military, or 
the socially conscious hip crowd. (Flier, 1998, p. 114) 
 Bernsand remarks, “It is more seldom pointed out that the original connota-
tions of the term specifically relate it to the struggle for survival under harsh rural 
conditions…it would not seem unreasonable to argue that surzhyk in some circum-
stances kept hunger away” (Bernsand, 2006, p. 87).  He further cites Ukrainian 
linguists who point out the linguistic essence of Ukrainian that remains in surzhyk, 
as well as explicit discourse supporting a “better surzhyk than Russian!” ideology. 
The Reality of Two Languages in Individual Lives
Pennycook states that “language policy can only be understood in the complex 
contexts of language use” (2000, p. 64).  In the biographic interviews she conduct-
ed with Ukrainians, Bilaniuk found not only stories that reflected the geographi-
cal patterns and historical status of Ukrainian and Russian described in previous 
sections, but also “relationships that defy the stereotype, revealing heterogeneity 
in practices and ideologies” (2005, p. 38).  I too have observed anecdotally the 
individual language realities in Ukraine that conform to or defy stereotypes. In 
April 2008, I had dinner with a group of English teachers from Ukraine who were 
in New York for a conference. One teacher told me that her father was Russian 
and her mother was Ukrainian. When she said her father spoke both Russian and 
Ukrainian, a colleague replied, “really?”  The teacher then explained that her fa-
ther had taught at a school in a village, so he had to learn Ukrainian.  The impli-
cation was that she had to rationalize her Russian father’s study of Ukrainian, 
and notably she defined his use in terms of the urban-rural educational divide 
between Russian and Ukrainian.  In another example, I attended a conference in 
eastern Ukraine in May 2009 where the rector (president) of the university and 
city councilman gave their opening remarks in Ukrainian, but the British Council 
representative gave her opening remarks in Russian.  I was surprised to hear Rus-
sian in such a formal context, until I talked to her and found out she was originally 
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from Russia but moved to Donets’k 20 years ago because she married a Ukrainian. 
I didn’t question her directly about her knowledge of Ukrainian or her use of Rus-
sian in her speech, but her background, current location, and language use suggest 
she is an ethnic Russian who has remained a monolingual Russian16.  In contrast, 
an ethnic Russian who moved to central-western Ukraine in 1999 and admits she 
“loves languages” and is “enchanted with Ukrainian” has over time shifted from 
using Russian to Ukrainian to tutor students in English—in part because of the 
language-in-education practices:
Now I mostly work with kids who all attend Ukrainian schools.  And 
first, it came to terms like grammar terms, and they didn’t know the Rus-
sian equivalents, they only knew them in Ukrainian, so at first I had to 
learn the grammar terms, and then it was, like we did the translation ex-
ercises, they were supposed to do for their homework in Ukrainian, and I 
was teaching in Russian, and then I, well, first my Ukrainian was getting 
better and better with the years, and then I felt like, three languages were 
too much, and now I teach only in Ukrainian.  And I have some Russian 
speaking kids, they come to me, they still mostly speak Russian, but I 
conduct lessons in Ukrainian because they hear it at their English lessons 
at school. I think it’s more natural to them. (LB, personal communication, 
June 11, 2009)17
Finally, there is evidence at an individual level that education and geography 
are affecting the type of Ukrainian language young people speak. One university 
student in central-western Ukraine who grew up in Crimea said the Ukrainian 
she studied in school is pure because it’s learned in a textbook, but the Ukrainian 
spoken in central-west Ukraine is “weird” because it’s a mix of Polish, Russian, 
and Ukrainian.  People from the region are surprised to the point of stopping and 
staring at someone who speaks such pure Ukrainian (VE, personal communica-
tion, June 10, 2009).      
In short, there is ample evidence in the Ukrainian context that the definition 
of basic linguistic terms such as “native language”, “bilingualism” and “codemix-
ing” is not at all basic.  While the use of Ukrainian has had high symbolic sup-
port since independence, both Ukrainian and Russian have been actively used 
languages in Soviet and post-Soviet times, and they continue to be used and mixed 
to varying degrees in ways that are only occasionally considered problematic.  The 
degree to which English may add to or supplant these languages will be discussed 
in the next section.
Situating English in the Language Ecology of Ukraine
With one official language, one language of wider communication, a fused 
variety, and several languages of national minorities already vying for attention in 
the Ukrainian landscape, it is hard to imagine how English could fit into the lan-
guage ecology of Ukraine.  Robert Phillipson, however, contends that it is exactly 
this kind of environment in which English can be most threatening:  
World-wide, language policy is torn between top-down pressures to 
maintain the position of national languages, and bottom up pressures to 
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secure linguistic diversity and the implementation of language rights. Im-
pacting on both of these trends is the ever-increasing use of English world-wide. 
(2006, p. 346, emphasis mine)  
Phillipson’s statement implies that in Ukraine the government is promoting 
Ukrainian, and the community is working to preserve its rights to speak either 
only Ukrainian (or Ukrainian and Russian or another language), but the drive for 
English may hinder or otherwise impact these goals.  
It has already been said that the Ukrainian government has sought to pass leg-
islation to limit the use of English and other foreign languages in movies in order to 
protect the use of Ukrainian.  The only other evidence of national planning of English 
use in Ukraine is found at the Ukrainian Ministry of Education. For English - and 
other general education subjects - the Ministry of Education disseminates national 
curriculum guidelines, textbook recommendations, and training manuals for each 
year of study (Ministerstvo Osvity i Nauky Ukrajiny, 2002). The Ministry also regulates 
specialized elementary and secondary schools, including those which specialize in the 
teaching of foreign languages (c.f. Ministerstvo Osvity i Nauky Ukrajiny, 2009). These 
efforts, however, may be falling short of the teachers’ and students’ desired levels of 
English knowledge. For example, in a 90-minute English club discussion about teach-
ing and learning English, participants spent nearly 20 minutes discussing which text-
books to use in the classroom.  During that time they described the low quality of 
English textbooks provided by the government, and debated whether teachers should 
supplement the national textbooks (provided for free to teachers) with photocopies 
from “authentic textbooks” (textbooks from British or American publishers), or risk a 
scandal by persuading all parents in a class to go against school regulations and agree 
to buy authentic textbooks.  
There is further evidence for the bottom-up development of English in Ukraine 
in education and employment. Since 1991, demand for private English language 
studies has grown (Bilaniuk, 2003; Fennell, 2001). This is likely related to econom-
ics; one English professor estimates that 60% of job offers in his city require knowl-
edge of English or German (YS, personal communication, June 9, 2009).    Uni-
versities appear to be setting their own policies regarding faculty, teaching, and 
the English language. The rector of the Dnipropetrovs’k University of Economics 
and Law (a private institution) announced at a conference in May 2009 that they 
intend to teach all subjects in English to students of the third year on, and to hire 
teachers only if they have a good command of a foreign language.  A few years 
ago, Khmel’nyt’skyi National University in central western Ukraine began offer-
ing English classes to professors through the Office for Continuing Education and 
Professional Development; professors who take this class have added points to 
their annual rating/evaluation (LA, personal communication, June 9, 2009).  
 There is even evidence that English may be competing more directly with 
Ukrainian—and winning—due to regional acquisition planning or a lack thereof. 
Friedman (2006) quotes a school official in Vinnitsya who told her that the number 
of Ukrainian class hours had to be cut to accommodate English lessons.  Søvik 
(2007) describes focus group interviews with students in Eastern Ukraine who 
lament that the Ukrainian government hasn’t provided sufficient incentives to at-
tend Ukrainian classes, whereas there is greater economic incentive to learn Eng-
lish or German.  As two students reflected,  
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If you want to go to Israel, learn [the language], it is even free. Here 
courses in Ukrainian cost the same amount as courses in English, other 
foreign languages. (Søvik, 2007, p. 194)
99% [of political science students] stop learning Ukrainian and begin 
learning English. Then one comes to a certain level of knowledge of the 
English language. Then what does one do? The person is not even going 
to bring the level of Ukrainian up to the level of English or to the level of 
Russian, but start to learn German from scratch and try to bring German 
to the level of knowledge of English. (Søvik, 2007, p. 188)
English also seems to have a higher social status in Ukraine than Ukrainian. 
Despite the Ukrainianization laws and the stigma of mixing Russian and Ukrai-
nian, mixing English with Ukrainian in speech is fashionable. In advertising, it 
achieves a particular stylistic effect (Bilaniuk 2003, 2005; Bilaniuk & Melnyk 
2008).  Bilaniuk (2003) further demonstrates through a matched-guise study that 
the English-Ukrainian speaker in her study is rated more positively in English by 
Ukrainophone and Russophone speakers for all personality traits, suggesting Eng-
lish may have a higher implicit status than both Ukrainian and Russian. Bilaniuk 
adds, however, that this may be connected with the economic opportunities and 
projected image of wealth of English speakers.  
On the other hand, it seems highly unlikely that English will ever replace 
Ukrainian or Russian as a national language or language of wider communication 
in the country.  As one Ukrainian teacher of English put it, “English will never be 
the first language in Ukraine, but only as a foreign language, as well as, perhaps, 
Russian” (NL, personal communication, April, 21, 2008).  An American teacher 
said metaphorically, “English in Ukraine is like mustard on a hot dog.  The mus-
tard can’t replace the hot dog” (TC, personal communication, June 15, 2009).  A 
pilot survey of 27 students at a Ukrainian university supports these sentiments; 
89% of survey respondents strongly disagreed that English should be the state 
language of Ukraine, and the remainder neither agreed nor disagreed (Goodman 
& Lyulkun, 2008).
Conclusion and Implications
A question in language policy research has been posed, “Is multilingualism 
an outcome of the policy, or does it develop and persist contrary to or indepen-
dently of the policy?” (Schiffman, 1996, as cited in Wiley, 2002).   It has been shown 
through the Ukrainian context that the answer is not always so dichotomous, and 
that other factors unique to a language context must be taken into account.  His-
torically in Ukraine, language policy has strived to assert the power of a single lan-
guage (either Russian or Ukrainian). The means of policy implementation in Soviet 
times alternatively crushed individuals attempting to cultivate a language under 
the law, or left room for the development and use of two languages under newer 
laws, albeit with significant power differentials.  In the post-Soviet era, there is still 
evidence of top-down control of language planning and policy and a certain level 
of hegemony for state control of language policy which affects Ukrainians’ sym-
bolic views of the Ukrainian language.  On the other hand, increasingly in Ukraine 
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people have had the freedom to vocalize their concerns when it appears their lan-
guage rights are being denied, and to define their use of language in terms that are 
most compatible with their sense of national identity and linguistic culture.  At the 
individual level, historical and current monolingualism or multilingualism may 
be influenced by a combination of factors including language policy, geography, 
ethnicity, symbolic value of a language, education, and personal feelings about 
the language.  English has its own symbolic value in the country, and appears to 
have a limited but potentially growing impact; for that reason Phillipson is right 
to contend that it should be monitored in Ukraine and elsewhere.  Yet the case of 
English in Ukraine may also serve as an example of how bottom-up practices and 
micro-level policies can contribute to the development of a language in a country 
in the absence of a strong national planning agenda.
In closing, it should be said that the Ukrainian nation is still a young one, and 
the wave of Ukrainianization could theoretically shift again if someone is elected 
on a pro-Russian platform (US, personal communication, April 26, 2008).  Contin-
ued monitoring of the political situation as well as explicit and implicit language 
policy practices in Ukraine is necessary to ensure language rights for speakers of 
all languages in the country. More research is also needed on the attitudes, status 
and educational access or conditions of national minorities other than Russian in 
Ukraine.  Finally, more systematic, nationwide data on the historical, current, and 
predicted position of English within the language ecology of Ukraine is needed.  
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 Notes
1This framework and the questions that underlie the theoretical approach have 
been criticized in recent years (c.f. Moore, 2000; Ricento, 2000; Wiley, 2002) for 
being arbitrary and for not reflecting the individual reality of language use.  I 
found that corpus, status and acquisition planning as categories were a useful 
starting point for a literature review on macro-level aspects of language planning 
and policy in Ukraine that I might have overlooked otherwise, and for that 
reason I reference them in this paper.       
 2I lived in Ukraine from 2001-2003 and have made multiple visits since then. 
Each time I have been in Ukraine I have discovered aspects of Ukrainian society 
that surprise me and which have often been explained to me with the expression 
“It’s our mentality.” 
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 3This terminology is not unique to Ukraine.  In an 2008 issue of The 
International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism there are articles on 
“Kazakhization” (Kazakhstan) and “Estonianization” (Estonia).   
4According to Shevelov (1989), the official policy said workers who do not speak 
Ukrainian on the job must be fired.  However, higher ranking officials who did 
not speak Ukrainian managed to avoid dismissal.
5According to Magosci (2007), Galicia was a principality of Kievan Rus’ which 
joined with Volhynia and later became a region of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
This territory is distinct from the region of Spain also known as Galicia.  
6Some scholars suggest the covert reason for the end of Ukrainianization is 
simply that Stalin’s approach to the peasants shifted from appeasement to 
decimation (Bilaniuk, 2005; Shevelov, 1989).
 7At the end of the English language translation it is written, “Official English 
translation.  The only authentic text is the text in the state language of Ukraine.”
8While I was in Ukraine in the spring of 2009, I regularly saw Russian-language 
programming with Ukrainian subtitles. A Russian live comedy show, however, 
was broadcast without subtitles. 
9“Kyiv” [kıiv] is the transliteration of the Ukrainian name for the capital of 
Ukraine (Київ).  “Kiev” [ki Ev], as it is more commonly known in English, is 
the transliteration of the Russian (Киев).  Since Ukrainian is now the official 
language of Ukraine, I use the Ukrainian transliteration unless the original text 
uses the Russian variant. However, a preference for the spelling “Kyiv” or an 
insistence that “Kyiv” is the only correct spelling may index a preference for 
Ukrainian or uptake of Ukrainianization policies.   
10According to the census data, other choices for mother tongue are Ukrainian, 
Russian, or another language. 
 11The terms on this page come from the English language version of the 
Census website. The English words ‘Moldavian’ and ‘Moldovan’ are used 
interchangeably in Ukraine. Both refer to the people and the variety of Romanian 
from the neighboring post-Soviet republic of Moldova, not the Moldavian people 
and dialect of northern Romania. Likewise, Belarussian is used to refer to the 
language of Belarus in Ukraine, while the more culturally sensitive term in 
Belarus is now ‘Belarusian’ to distinguish it from Russian.  
12Søvik (2007) adds that the ECRML was challenged in the Ukrainian courts and 
annulled in 2000 because it failed to protect the state language.  That decision 
was later reversed.
13According to Kyiv Post, in January 2009, the Ukrainian foreign minister 
responded to this notion of brotherhood by saying, “The time has come to get 
rid of stereotypes and stamps of brotherhood, historic unity and other things. We 
are the two sovereign states and we should build our relations on the basis of the 
international law” (“Ukraine’s Foreign Minister,” 2009).
14Belarus also has a mixed Belarusian-Russian form referred to derogatively as 
trasianka, but the current social meaning of trasianka is slightly different from 
surzhyk. See Giger and Sloboda (2008) for more about mixed Belarusian-Russian.
15See Flier (1998) for a more detailed description of the linguistic environments in 
which such third forms occur in Ukrainian-Russian codemixing.   
16An alternative account of this woman’s language use is that she knows 
Ukrainian, but feels more comfortable using Russian because she is proficient in 
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it and less likely to be critiqued.  See Bilaniuk (2003) for more about Ukrainians’ 
opinions of others’ Ukrainian and Russian proficiency.  
17I attended a meeting of a weekly English Club organized by a friend in central-
western Ukraine and asked English teachers and students questions about how 
they learned English and in what language(s) they teach English.  This quote is 
from my transcript of that meeting. 
References
Arel, D. (1995).  Language politics in independent Ukraine:  Towards one or two state 
languages?  Nationalities Papers, 23(3), 597-622.
Arel, D. (1996).  A lurking cascade of assimilation in Kiev? Post-Soviet Affairs, 12(1), 73-90.
Arel, D. (2002).  Interpreting “nationality” and “language” in the 2001 Ukrainian census. 
Post-Soviet Affairs, 18(3), 213-249.  
Arel, D. (2006).  Introduction:  Theorizing politics of cultural identities in Russia and 
Ukraine.  In D. Arel & B. A. Ruble (Eds.), Rebounding identities:  The politics of 
identity in Russia and Ukraine (pp. 1-30).  Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press.
Baker, C. (2001).  Foundations of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism (3rd ed).  Clevedon: 
Multilingual Matters.
Bernsand, N. (2006). Othering “Surzhyk” in implicit metalinguistic discourse.  In B. 
Törnquist-Plewa (Ed.), History, language, and society in the borderlands of Europe: 
Ukraine and Belarus in focus (pp.77-13).  Malmö, Sweden:  Sekel.
Bilaniuk, L. (2003).  Gender, language attitudes, and language status in Ukraine.  Language 
in Society, 32(1), 47-78.
Bilaniuk, L. (2005).  Contested tongues:  Language politics and cultural correction in Ukraine. 
Ithaca:  Cornell University Press.
Bilaniuk, L., & Melnyk, S. (2008).  A tense and shifting balance:  Bilingualism and education 
in Ukraine.  The International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 11(3-4), 
340-372. doi: 10.2167/beb543.0
Borisow, P. (2008, February 28).  Ridding Ukraine’s film industry of the RusUkrKino 
middlemen (Opinion-Editorial).  Kyiv Post.  Retrieved from http://www.
kyivpost.com.  
Cherednychenko, O.  (1997).  Language problems and language policy in Ukraine.  Pro 
ukrainskyi pravopys i problemy movy: Zbirnyk dopovidei movnoi sektsii 16-
oi richnoi Konferentsii ukrainskoi problematyky, Urbana-Shampein, Ill., 20-25 
chervnia 1997 [Essays on Ukrainian orthography and language:  Proceedings of 
the 16th annual conference on Ukrainian subjects at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, June 20-25, 1997] (pp. 51-59). New York/Lviv:   Shevchenko 
Scientific Society.
Cooper, R. (1989).  Language Planning and Social Change.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press.
Fennell, B. A. (2001). A history of English:  A sociolinguistic approach.  Malden, MA:  Blackwell 
Publishing.
Fimyar, O. (2008).  Educational policy-making in post-Communist Ukraine as an example 
of emerging governmentality:  Discourse analysis of curriculum choice and 
assessment policy documents (1999-2003).  Journal of Educational Policy, 23(6), 571-
594.  
Fishman, J. A. (1979).  Bilingual education, language planning, and English.  English World-
Wide 1(1),  11-24.  
Fishman, J. A. (1997).  In praise of the beloved language:  A comparative view of positive 
ethnolinguistic consciousness.  Berlin:  Mouton de Gruyter.
Fishman, J. A. (2006).  Language Shift.  In T. Ricento (Ed.), An introduction to language policy: 
Theory and method (pp. 311-328).  Malden, MA:  Blackwell.
Flier, M. (1998).  Surzhyk:  The rules of engagement.  Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 22, 113-
136.
37
ThE EcoLogy of LaNguagE iN ukraiNE
Friedman, D. A. (2006).  (Re)imagining the nation:  Language socialization in Ukrainian 
classrooms.  Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Los 
Angeles.
Fournier, A. (2002).  Mapping identities: Russian resistance to linguistic Ukrainisation in 
Central and Eastern Ukraine.  Europe-Asia Studies, 54(3), 415-433.  
Giger, M., & Sloboda, M. (2008).  Language management and language problems in 
Belarus:  Education and beyond.  The International Journal of Bilingual Education 
and Bilingualism, 11(3-4), 315-339.  doi: 10.2167/beb542.0  
Goodman, B. A., & Lyulkun, N. A. (2008, April).  Will Ukrainian survive globalization?  Paper 
presented at the National Council of Less Commonly Taught Languages 11th 
Annual Conference, Madison, WI. 
Gordon, E. J. (1996).  The revival of Polish national consciousness:  A comparative study of 
Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine.  Nationalities Papers, 24(2), 216-236.
Hornberger, N. H. (2003).  Multilingual language policies and the continua of biliteracy: 
An ecological approach.  In N. H. Hornberger (Ed.), Continua of biliteracy:  An 
ecological framework for educational policy, research, and practice in multilingual 
settings (pp. 315-339).  Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
Hrycak, A. (2006).  Institutional legacies and language revival in Ukraine.  In D. Arel & B. 
A. Ruble (Eds.), Rebounding identities:  The politics of identity in Russia and Ukraine 
(pp. 62-88).  Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Janmaat, J. G. (1999).  Language politics in education and the response of the Russians in 
Ukraine.  Nationalities Papers, 27(3), 475-501.
Kreindler, I. (1997).  Multilingualism in the successor states of the Soviet Union.  Annual 
Review of Applied Linguistics 1997, 17, 91-112.
Lewytzkyj, B. (1984).  Politics and society in Soviet Ukraine 1953-1980.  Edmonton, Alberta: 
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.
Magosci, P. R. (2007).  Ukraine: An illustrated history.  Seattle:  University of Washington 
Press.
Ministerstvo Osvity i Nauky Ukrajiny (2002). [Table of curricula, textbooks, and teaching 
manuals recommended by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine for use in 
general education lessons in the Ukrainian language in the 2002/03 school year.] (N. 
1/9-339).  Retrieved from www.mon.gov.ua/laws/list_1_9_339.doc. 
Ministerstvo Osvity i Nauky Ukrajiny (2009). Pro obhovorennia proektu Prymirnoho 
polozhennja pro spetsialisovanu shkolu z pohlyblenym vivchennjam inoztmnykh 
mov [Request for comments on the project of preliminary regulations of specialized 
schools of foreign languages.] (N. 1/9-511).  Retrieved from www.mon.gov.ua/gr/
obg/2009/prymyrne_pologennya.doc. 
Moore, H. (2000).  Language policies as virtual realities: Two Australian examples.  In T. 
Ricento (Ed.), Ideology, politics, and language policies:  Focus on English (pp. 25-47). 
Amsterdam:  John Benjamins.
Nic Craith, M. (2006).  Europe and the Politics of Language:  Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders. 
Hampshire, England:  Palgrave Macmillian.
Orlova, D. (2008, February 7).  New higher education entrance exams to launch this year. 
Kyiv Post.   Retrieved from http://www.kyivpost.com/
Pavlenko, A. (2002).  Some common and distinctive extra-linguistic features in the histories 
of Scots and Ukrainian.  Scottish Language 2002, 21, 13-26.
Pennycook, A. (2000).  Language, ideology and hindsight:  Lessons from colonial language 
policies.  In T. Ricento (Ed.), Ideology, politics, and language policies:  Focus on English 
(pp. 49-65).  Amsterdam:  John Benjamins.
Phillipson, R. (2006).  Language policy and linguistic imperialism.  In T. Ricento (Ed.), 
An introduction to language policy:  Theory and method (pp. 346-361).  Malden, MA: 
Blackwell.
Phillipson, R., & Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1996).  English only worldwide or language 
ecology?  TESOL Quarterly, 30(3), 429-452.
Poludenko, A. (2008, April 3). Council to tax global television networks, require Ukrainian. 
Kyiv Post.   Retrieved from http://www.kyivpost.com/
Ricento, T. (2000).  Historical and theoretical perspectives in language policy and planning. 
WPEL VoLumE 24, NumbEr 2
In T. Ricento (Ed.), Ideology, politics, and language policies:  Focus on English (pp. 
9-24).  Amsterdam:  John Benjamins.
Sewall, E. (2008, February 28).  Ukrainians prefer Soviet tradition of dubbing.  Kyiv Post. 
Retrieved from http://www.kyivpost.com/
Schiffman, H. (2006).  Language policy and linguistic culture.  In T. Ricento (Ed.), An 
introduction to language policy:  Theory and method (pp. 111-125).  Malden, MA: 
Blackwell.
Shevelov, G. Y. (1989).  The Ukrainian language in the first half of the twentieth century (1900-
1941):  Its state and status.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.
Solchanyk, R. (1985).  Language politics in the Ukraine.  In  I. T. Kreindler (Ed.), 
Sociolinguistic perspectives on Soviet national languages (pp. 57-105).  Berlin: Mouton 
de Gruyter.
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2003-2004).  Всеукраїнський 
Перепис Населення 2001 [All-Ukrainian population census 2001]. 
Retrieved from http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/
Stepanenko, V.  (1999).  The construction of identity and school policy in Ukraine.  Commack, 
NY:  Nova Science Publishers.
Søvik, M. (2007).  Support, resistance and pragmatism: An examination of motivation in language 
policy in Kharkiv, Ukraine.  Stockholm: Stockholm University.
Ukraine’s foreign minister:  There is no more brotherhood between Russian, Ukrainian 
people (2009, January 26).  Kyiv Post.   Retrieved from http://www.kyivpost.
com/
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2008).  Constitution of Ukraine.  Retrieved from http://www.
rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm.
Wexler, P. (1974).  Purism and language:  A study in modern Ukrainian and Belorussian 
nationalism.  Bloomington: Indiana University.
Wiley, T. G. (1996).  Language planning and policy.  In S. L. McKay & N. H. Hornberger 
(Eds.), Sociolinguistics and Language Teaching (pp. 103-147).  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Wiley, T. G. (2002).  Heinz Kloss revisited:  National socialist ideologue or champion of 
language-minority rights?  International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 154, 
83-97.
Wodak, R. (2006).  Linguistic analyses.  In T. Ricento (Ed.), An introduction to language 
policy:  Theory and method (pp. 170-193).  Malden, MA:  Blackwell.
Yakobets, A. (2004).  Situatia invatamantului romanesc in scolile din Ucraina [The Situation 
of Romanian Education in Ukrainian Schools.].  In D. Manuca, O. Ichim, & F-T. 
Olariu (Eds.), Spatiul lingvistic si literar romanesc din perspectiva integrarii europene 
[The Romanian linguistic and literary domain from the perspective of European 
integration] (pp. 351-356).  Iasi, Romania:  Editura Alfa.
ThE EcoLogy of LaNguagE iN ukraiNE
39
